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PRESS EXCEPTIONALISM
Sonja R. West
I am very much afraid of definitions, and yet one is almost forced to
make them. One must take care, too, not to be inhibited by them.1
INTRODUCTION
The Occupy Wall Street movement was one of the largest grassroots political demonstrations in American history.2 The protests
raised issues about government policies and social structures that
sparked debate nationwide. Treatment of the demonstrators by public
officials garnered scrutiny too,3 as did the tactics of the protestors,
which some alleged included unlawful conduct.4
Yet despite the high level of newsworthiness, many reporters who
attempted to cover the protests faced significant roadblocks. Some
were denied access to protest sites.5 Others were arrested,6 even when
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
 Associate Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. This article has benefited
from feedback received following presentations at the American Association of Law Schools’ annual conference, at the Freedom of Expression Scholars Conference, and at Emory Law School. I owe
a special debt of thanks to Dan Coenen and Lyrissa Lidsky. I would also like to thank Lindsay Sain
Jones, Savanna Nolan, Matthew Noller, and Kimberly Scott for their research assistance.
1 Letter from Robert Delaunay, French artist, to August Macke, German artist (1912), archived
at http://perma.cc/W56K-RQRD.
2 Allison Kilkenny, Year One: Occupy Wall Street Plans Anniversary Protest of Wall Street,
NATION (Sept. 10, 2012, 9:40 AM), http://www.thenation.com/blog/169823/year-one-occupy-wall
-street-plans-anniversary-protest-wall-street, archived at http://perma.cc/ML5Q-E4LG.
3 See, e.g., Al Baker & Joseph Goldstein, Officer’s Pepper-Spraying of Protesters Is Under Investigation, N.Y. TIMES: CITY ROOM (Sept. 28, 2011, 1:37 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes
.com/2011/09/28/police-department-to-examine-pepper-spray-incident/, archived at http://perma.cc
/W32Z-BFXK (discussing NYPD officer’s use of pepper spray on female protestors); Larry Gordon,
UC to Pay Settlement in Davis Pepper Spray Case, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 13, 2012, http://articles
.latimes.com/2012/sep/13/local/la-me-uc-pepper-spray-20120914, archived at http://perma.cc/D5CD
-UQ4T (detailing settlement paid to UC Davis protestors after campus police used pepper spray on
them).
4 See, e.g., Charles P. Pierce, This Cannot Be the Way Occupy Ends, ESQUIRE: POL. BLOG
(Nov. 17, 2011), http://www.esquire.com/blogs/politics/occupy-wall-street-violence-6575448, archived
at http://perma.cc/48VC-ZS62 (bemoaning protestors’ “reciprocal violence” and arguing that the protest “can’t end in images of bleeding cops and tossed barricades”).
5 Brian Stelter & Al Baker, Reporters Say Police Denied Access to Protest Site, N.Y. TIMES:
MEDIA DECODER (Nov. 15, 2011, 11:06 AM), http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/15
/reporters-say-police-denied-access-to-protest-site, archived at http://perma.cc/5N7Z-QDKB.
6 See Brian Stelter, Protest Puts Coverage in Spotlight, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2011, at B1 (noting that, as of November 2011, “26 reporters and photographers have been arrested at protests
linked to the movement”); Press Release, Soc’y of Prof’l Journalists, SPJ Condemns Arrests of Journalists at Occupy Protests (Nov. 15, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/4983-ZCHN (“[A]t least six
journalists have been arrested or detained while covering the protests . . . .”).
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they could and did display press credentials.7 Airspace was blocked to
prevent filming from news helicopters.8 This shabby treatment of
journalists led to condemnation by press organizations and caused the
United States’s ranking on the Reporters Without Borders’ Press
Freedom Index to drop sharply, from twentieth to forty-seventh place.9
The experiences of the reporters covering the Occupy protests reflect a broader reality about journalism: on a day-to-day basis, American journalists deal with legal uncertainties in the pursuit of news.
There are difficulties of access to property (sometimes even public
property),10 information,11 and government meetings.12 Journalists
have uncertain protections against subpoenas and face frequent government demands that they testify about what they have learned while
gathering news or that they reveal the identities of confidential
sources.13 Reporters’ notes, photographs, emails, drafts, and video
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
7 Press Release, Soc’y of Prof’l Journalists, supra note 6 (“[T]he journalists were either wearing
press credentials or explained to police that they were reporters covering the protests.”).
8 See Robert Mackey, Drone Journalism Arrives, N.Y. TIMES: THE LEDE (Nov. 17,
2011, 6:43 PM), http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/11/17/drone-journalism-arrives, archived at
http://perma.cc/3M8R-M6Z8.
9 World Press Freedom Index 2011–2012, REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, http://en.rsf
.org/press-freedom-index-2011-2012,1043.html (last visited May 10, 2014), archived at http://perma
.cc/C83L-YDRU (“The United States (47th) also owed its fall of 27 places to the many arrests of
journalist [sic] covering Occupy Wall Street protests.”).
10 See, e.g., Mark Washburn, Observer Religion Reporter Arrested in Raleigh Protest, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER, June 10, 2013, http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2013/06/10/4098290/observer-religion
-reporter-arrested.html, archived at http://perma.cc/D2R2-BTLA (stating that a reporter “failed to move
away from a crowd of about 60 that was demonstrating and peacefully surrendering to arrest. . . . [He]
was handcuffed and taken along with the arrested protesters . . . .”).
11 See 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c)(1)–(10) (2012) (outlining exemptions to government’s obligation to release information under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552); Response Times,
REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, http://www.rcfp.org/federal-open
-government-guide/federal-freedom-information-act/response-times (last visited May 10, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/444J-LJB3 (“For journalists, the nearly routine failure of agencies to provide timely access to records has triggered the need to go outside the [Freedom of Information]
Act . . . .”). For examples of cases rejecting journalists’ FOIA requests under the statutory exemptions, see U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 757, 780
(1989) (rejecting journalist’s FOIA request for FBI record of organized crime figure suspected of
bribing congressman); FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 631–32, 634 n.1 (1982) (rejecting journalist’s
FOIA request for FBI records requested by President Nixon); U.S. Dep’t of State v. Wash. Post Co.,
456 U.S. 595, 596, 602–03 (1982) (rejecting newspaper’s FOIA request for Iranian nationals’ passport application information); Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 936
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (rejecting public interest groups’ FOIA request for information on thousands of
foreign nationals detained during September 11 investigation).
12 See 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c)(1)–(10) (listing exemptions); The Government in the Sunshine Act, REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, http://www.rcfp.org/federal-open-government
-guide/federal-open-meetings-laws/government-sunshine-act (last visited May 10, 2014), archived
at http://perma.cc/L28S-RXZS (“The Sunshine Act includes 10 exemptions or reasons that the government can refuse to open an agency meeting.”).
13 See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 438 F.3d 1141, 1145–50 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(upholding contempt orders against journalists for refusing to comply with subpoena).
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outtakes are potentially subject to search by law enforcement.14
Members of the press also face risks of criminal or tort liability if they
engage in undercover reporting15 or reveal leaked information.16
The underlying problem journalists face is that they are treated by
the law as being no different than the subjects they are covering or,
perhaps, mere curious bystanders.17 For constitutional purposes at
least, it is entirely irrelevant to courts whether the speakers are members of the press or whether they are actively pursuing the news.
To be sure, once journalists publish or broadcast a story, their
speech — like everyone’s speech — enjoys powerful First Amendment
protections.18 Journalists are shielded — again, as is everyone — from
prior restraints19 and content-based censorship of their messages.20
But when it comes to recognizing the special role of reporters as
watchdogs and conduits of information for the citizenry as a whole,
the Supreme Court has taken a hands-off approach.
One of the primary reasons for this failure to distinguish between
constitutional protections for speech and the press is the problem of
identification. In order to recognize unique press protections, the
Court must figure out who or what the press is. The Occupy protests
again illustrate the problem. Among the crowds at these demonstra–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
14 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa(b) (2012) (setting forth situations where police may seize media’s
“documentary materials”). But see Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 552–53 (1978) (rejecting
Fourth Amendment challenge to police search of student newspaper office for photographs), superseded by statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa, as recognized in Sennett v. United States, 667 F.3d 531 (4th
Cir. 2012).
15 See, e.g., Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 510 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding
that journalists who lie on employment applications to gain access to private facilities or use secret
cameras for newsgathering activities are not protected by the First Amendment and may be liable
for trespass or other offenses).
16 See, e.g., Ann E. Marimow, A Rare Peek into a Justice Department Leak Probe, WASH. POST,
May 19, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/a-rare-peek-into-a-justice-department-leak
-probe/2013/05/19/0bc473de-be5e-11e2-97d4-a479289a31f9_story.html, archived at http://perma
.cc/TSE3-N962 (discussing the criticism of the Obama Administration’s naming of Fox News reporter James Rosen as a “co-conspirator” in criminal activity for soliciting the leak of classified information).
17 See Joe Strupp, Texas Journalists: Lt. Gov’s Threat to Arrest Reporters “Worrisome,” MEDIA
MATTERS FOR AM. (July 1, 2013, 3:58 PM), http://mediamatters.org/blog/2013/07/01/texas
-journalists-lt-govs-threat-to-arrest-repo/194705, archived at http://perma.cc/T387-5KY9.
18 See Potter Stewart, “Or of the Press,” 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633 (1975) (noting that the press
is “guaranteed that freedom, to be sure, but so are we all, because of the Free Speech Clause”).
19 See, e.g., Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976) (striking prior restraint on media
coverage of criminal trial); N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam)
(striking prior restraint on publication of Pentagon Papers); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283
U.S. 697, 723 (1931) (striking prior restraint against anti-Semitic newspaper).
20 See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 827 (2000) (striking law
requiring cable operators to “scramble” sexually explicit programming); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.
Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 123 (1991) (striking law imposing financial burden on works describing author’s crimes); Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481
U.S. 221, 234 (1987) (striking content-based magazine tax).
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tions were many people utilizing their constitutional speech rights in
ways that might seem “press-like.” An office worker on his way to
lunch might see a traffic backup caused by the protestors and use his
smartphone to tweet a message to his followers warning them to avoid
the area. A cable comedy show might send a “correspondent” to the
site to interview protestors and poke fun at some of the colorful participants.21 A newly graduated journalism student could decide to write
an article about the protests with the hope of getting her first publication as a freelance writer. Then there are the bloggers. Some bloggers
might post regularly about related issues and thus be attempting to
gather information for their established readership whereas others
might be offering unrelated content on an inconsistent basis to an unproven audience.
This all raises some important questions: Are these speakers the
press? Are all of them or only some of them? And does the difficulty
of answering this question confine us to a reading of the First
Amendment that gives no meaning to the Press Clause that reaches
beyond the Speech Clause?
This Article advances the principle of press exceptionalism — that
there exist certain speakers who fulfill unique roles in our democracy.
These press speakers devote time, resources, and expertise to the vital
constitutional tasks of informing the public on newsworthy matters
and providing a check on the government and the powerful.22 We
must recognize these speakers in order to consider and potentially protect their specific needs. A continuing refusal to do so, moreover,
comes with risks. These risks include not only a failure to fulfill the
promises of the First Amendment, but also widespread societal costs
arising out of reduced information flow and weakened government
scrutiny.
The challenge, however, is that there are also numerous other
speakers who use their speech rights in ways that at times appear to be
“press-like.” I refer to these speakers as “occasional public commentators.” Aided increasingly by advances in communication technology,
occasional public commentators share information and ideas about
matters of public interest to a potentially broad audience in a timely
manner — the very activities that were once considered the exclusive
province of the press. Because viewing occasional public commenta–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
21 See, e.g., The Daily Show with John Stewart: The 99% (Comedy Central television broadcast
Oct. 18, 2011), available at http://www.thedailyshow.com/watch/tue-october-18-2011/the-99, archived at http://perma.cc/R9XM-SA7W.
22 Sonja R. West, The Stealth Press Clause, 48 GA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at
45–46) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (drawing on Supreme Court precedent to establish that the press fulfills two unique constitutional functions: gathering and disseminating news
to the public and providing a check on the government and the powerful).
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tors as press speakers comes with constitutional costs, as I explained in
a prior article,23 it is desirable to distinguish between the two groups.
Therefore, I seek to establish a theoretically sound and practically
workable methodology for identifying and distinguishing these two
types of speakers.
Drawing on past attempts to identify the press and also using the
Supreme Court’s recent discussion of who is and who is not a “minister” for the purposes of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment24
as a model, I suggest that courts should take a holistic approach to
finding the press. This approach could include relying on the cues of
third parties and public institutions as proxies, as well as considering
the speaker’s track record of publication and audience to determine
which speakers are best fulfilling the press functions.
I develop these ideas in three parts. Part I explores who are members of the press for First Amendment purposes, what they do, and
why it matters that they be identified. Part II then considers how
changing technology has impacted the search for the press, concluding
that, rather than defeating the effort, it has helped to focus it and to
alleviate concerns of elitism. Finally, Part III combines past efforts by
others to identify the press with insights from the Court’s recent discussion on how to determine who is a “minister” for the purposes of
the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment to offer a usable beginning framework in our search for the press.
I. IDENTIFYING THE PRESS
The First Amendment refers separately to freedoms of “speech”25
and “press.”26 While it is clear that all individuals — and even corporations — have speech rights, confusion over the meaning of the term
“press” abounds. This Part explores the relationship between the
Speech and Press Clauses. It then discusses how press speakers differ
from other speakers and why it matters that we identify them.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
23 See Sonja R. West, Awakening the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1025, 1030–31 (2011). Defining the press too broadly makes the Press Clause’s protections redundant with those of the
Speech Clause. Id. at 1056. Attempting to expand the definition of the press to cover even speakers
on the periphery, moreover, devolves to including nearly everyone as potential members of the
press. Such an overly broad definition is unworkable and prevents the expansion of rights to those
performing press functions. Id. at 1057.
24 See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).
25 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech . . . .”).
26 Id. (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of . . . the press . . . .”).
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A. The Press Clause Versus the Speech Clause
The relative successes of the First Amendment’s expression clauses
provide a study in contrast. The Speech Clause has assumed the role
of favorite child, lavished with attention by the Supreme Court. Over
the last century, the Court has solidified the central role of the Speech
Clause, interpreting its protections generously in the face of ambiguity,
confusion, and powerful countervailing interests. Undeterred by the
difficulty of the questions presented, the Court has found in the Speech
Clause a First Amendment home (even if at times a limited one) for
such dubiously valuable forms of speech as indecency,27 simulated
child pornography,28 corporate speech,29 commercial speech,30 hate
speech,31 animal snuff films,32 and displays of racism.33 Constitutional
claims that were finding doors closing in other areas, meanwhile,
found new life in the open embrace of the Speech Clause.34
The story of the Press Clause could not be more different. If the
Speech Clause is the Court’s favorite child, the Press Clause has been
the neglected one. During the same period that the Court has developed wide-ranging protections under the Speech Clause, it has all but
failed to notice the Press Clause’s existence, and when it has noticed, it
has been with a mindset of skepticism and defeatism. In the Speech
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
27 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (reversing conviction for wearing indecent
antidraft jacket in courthouse); cf. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 746 (1978) (assuming that
indecent monologue may have been protected if not disseminated through broadcast radio).
28 See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 258 (2002) (striking down the law that
banned virtual child pornography not involving actual children).
29 See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 886 (2010) (holding that the government may not
suppress corporate political speech altogether).
30 See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 570–71 (2001) (striking down certain limits
on tobacco advertisements); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557,
566 (1980) (setting forth four-part test for when commercial speech may be regulated).
31 See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1220–21 (2011) (rejecting suit against antigay group’s
hate speech at funeral protest).
32 See United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010) (striking down a ban on depictions
of animal cruelty).
33 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365–67 (2003) (opinion of O’Connor, J.) (holding that the
state could not ban all cross burnings); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395–96 (1992) (striking down content-based ban on cross burning).
34 See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 112 (2001) (holding that a
school’s exclusion of a religious children’s club from meeting on school property was unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S.
384, 387, 396–97 (1993) (holding that a school district violated the Speech Clause by denying a
church access to school grounds because of its religious viewpoint); see also Mark W. Cordes, Religion as Speech: The Growing Role of Free Speech Jurisprudence in Protecting Religious Liberty, 38
SW. L. REV. 235, 236 (2008) (exploring the growing strength of the Speech Clause for protecting religious liberty); Ralph D. Mawdsley, Access to Public School Facilities for Religious Expression by
Students, Student Groups and Community Organizations: Extending the Reach of the Free Speech
Clause, 2004 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 269, 270 (assessing the impact of recent Supreme Court jurisprudence on school districts and religious expression in schools).
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Clause context, the Court has found almost no case too messy to untangle. In case after case, the Court has extrapolated a complex web
of legal rules from the sparse text of the Speech Clause concerning protected and unprotected speech;35 quasi-protected speech;36 time, place,
and manner restrictions;37 viewpoint discrimination;38 subject-matter
discrimination;39 symbolic expression;40 and so on. Yet the Court has
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
35 See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942) (“There are certain welldefined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never
been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.”); see also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 764
(1982) (holding that child pornography is not protected by the First Amendment); Brandenburg v.
Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (explaining that a state may proscribe advocacy of the
use of force “where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and
is likely to incite or produce such action”); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957)
(“[O]bscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press”); Beauharnais v.
Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952) (“Libelous utterances [are not] within the area of constitutionally
protected speech . . . .”).
36 See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 747 (1978) (stating that the content of the
broadcast program was “‘vulgar,’ ‘offensive,’ and ‘shocking’” and “content of that character is not
entitled to absolute constitutional protection under all circumstances”); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy
v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976) (“In concluding that commercial
speech, like other varieties, is protected, we of course do not hold that it can never be regulated in
any way. Some forms of commercial speech regulation are surely permissible.”); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 818 (1975) (“The fact that the particular advertisement in appellant’s newspaper
had commercial aspects or reflected the advertiser’s commercial interests did not negate all First
Amendment guarantees.”).
37 See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (stating that the government
may impose time, place, or manner restrictions that are content neutral, narrowly tailored to serve a
significant government interest, and leave ample alternative channels open for communication);
Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647 (1981) (“[T]he First
Amendment does not guarantee the right to communicate one’s views at all times and places or in
any manner that may be desired.”).
38 See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (“The government must abstain from regulating speech when the specific motivating ideology or the opinion
or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the restriction.”); R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382 (“The First
Amendment generally prevents government from proscribing speech or even expressive conduct
because of disapproval of the ideas expressed.” (citation omitted)).
39 See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 316, 329 (1988) (holding that an ordinance that prohibited displays of a signs within 500 feet of a foreign embassy that “tend[ed] to bring that foreign government into public odium or public disrepute,” id. at 316, was unconstitutional on its face because
it was a content-based restriction on political speech in a public forum and was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S.
37, 45 (1983) (stating that for a state to enforce “a content-based exclusion it must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that
end”); Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means
that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject
matter, or its content.”).
40 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (“[C]onduct may be ‘sufficiently imbued with
elements of communication to fall within the scope of the First . . . Amendment[].’” (quoting Spence
v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 406 (1974) (per curiam))); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505–06 (1969) (holding that wearing an armband with the purpose of expressing
certain views “was closely akin to ‘pure speech,’” id. at 505, and “entitled to comprehensive protection under the First Amendment,” id. at 506).
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found the task of applying the Press Clause to be far more intimidating, stating that it “would present practical and conceptual difficulties
of a high order”41 and bemoaning the “long and difficult journey to
such an uncertain destination.”42
Why has the Court been so reluctant to breathe life into the Press
Clause yet so willing to foster the Speech Clause? One argument in
favor of this restrained Press Clause approach is that while the Speech
Clause protects speakers, the Press Clause protects technology. The
term “press” can, of course, refer both to those individuals who gather
and convey news as well as to the device originally used to print text
onto paper (the printing press). This ambiguity has led some to argue
that the intent of including constitutional press freedoms was to protect the latter — the printing press or its modern equivalents.43
While an appropriately in-depth response to this argument is outside the scope and space constraints of this Article, I contend that
there are reasons to be skeptical of interpreting the First Amendment’s
reference to “the press” as referring only to the right to publish and
disseminate one’s speech rather than as protecting a functional endeavor. First, the “press” of 1789 was a technology that allowed those
with means the ability to reach a broad audience and thereby, to perform crucial functions in our self-government.44 Yet what was once a
single, overlapping endeavor of using the printing press to widely disseminate viewpoints as a means of informing others and checking the
government has since split into two concepts — mass communication
technology and journalism.45 The understanding of the role and importance of the press at the time of the Framing maps more naturally
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
41
42
43

Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704 (1972).
Id. at 703.
See, e.g., Linda L. Berger, Shielding the Unmedia: Using the Process of Journalism to Protect
the Journalist’s Privilege in an Infinite Universe of Publication, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 1371, 1401–02
(2003) (“When the First Amendment was written, the ‘press’ was literally the same as the printing
press, merely a tool that any citizen could use to speak.”); Edward Lee, Freedom of the Press 2.0, 42
GA. L. REV 309, 339 (2008) (“As originally understood, the Free Press Clause was meant to protect
the printing press.”); Eugene Volokh, Freedom for the Press as an Industry, or for the Press as a
Technology? From the Framing to Today, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 459, 463 (2012) (“[P]eople during the
Framing era likely understood the text as fitting the press-as-technology model — as securing the
right of every person to use communications technology, and not just securing a right belonging exclusively to members of the publishing industry.”).
44 See Timothy E. Cook, Freeing the Presses: An Introductory Essay, in FREEING THE
PRESSES 1, 7–8 (Timothy E. Cook ed., 2005) (stating that “there are two theoretical traditions to
‘freedom of the press’ in United States history,” id. at 7, and noting that the “open press model was
as much in the air as the free press approach when the First Amendment was adopted,” id. at 8).
45 See Tim Wu, Machine Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1495, 1530 (2013) (discussing the difference
between search engines and newspapers and stating “the difference, in some fundamental way, between a tool and speech — the first directly serves the user, while the second attempts to persuade
him”).
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onto modern journalism than it does onto the personal use of modern
communication technology.46
Additionally, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Speech Clause
as more than merely a right to speak in a vacuum. Rather, speech
rights include the right to connect with an audience.47 If the Speech
Clause protects not only a right to speak but also a right to reach and
interact with a listener, this protection suggests that the Press Clause is
the repository for rights beyond the mere ability of a speaker to publish and disseminate his speech.
For purposes of this Article, therefore, I use the term “press” as referring to more than a right to use technology to publish one’s speech.
I contend that the First Amendment’s Press Clause was designed to
protect speakers who fulfill specific and important “press” functions
that differ from garden-variety speech values.
In an earlier article, moreover, I raised another theory for why the
Court has been so favorable to speech rights while simultaneously so
hesitant to embrace press rights.48 The Court has interpreted the
Speech Clause through the lens of constitutional overprotection. This
instinct to be overinclusive with speech rights is important — it ensures that speakers and viewpoints are not left out of our public debate. Yet constitutional overprotection is a poor fit with the Press
Clause. And, paradoxically, declaring that all or most speakers are
members of the press leads to the recognition of fewer constitutional
press rights.49
The Speech and Press Clauses function differently, yet they also
complement each other.50 The Speech Clause can work in tandem
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
46 See, e.g., West, supra note 23, at 1035–39 (detailing how the Supreme Court’s language involving the press is in line with the use of the term “press” to refer to the news media and conflicts
with use of the term as “technology”).
47 See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997) (referring to the constitutional right of
adults “to receive [speech] and to address to one another”); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976) (“Freedom of speech presupposes a willing speaker. But where a speaker exists, as is the case here, the protection afforded is to the communication,
to its source and to its recipients both.” (footnote omitted)); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765
(1972) (holding that speech rights include the listener’s right to “sustained, face-to-face debate, discussion and questioning”); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (stating that the
freedom of speech includes “the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences”).
48 West, supra note 23.
49 Id. at 1056–58; cf. Philip Hamburger, Essay, More Is Less, 90 VA. L. REV. 835, 838 (2004) (observing, with respect to religious liberty, that “an enlarged definition of any right may invite limitations on the circumstances in which it is available”).
50 See John D. Inazu, The Four Freedoms and the Future of Religious Liberty 24 (Wash. Univ.
Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 12-10-08, 2012), archived at
http://perma.cc/MZ8J-9SRM (“The modern era has witnessed a decline in . . . the distinctiveness of
the rights contained in the First Amendment.”).
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with the Press Clause51 precisely because nonpress speakers can fall
back on the many protections the Speech Clause puts in place.52 Constitutional sorting always poses risks of discrimination, of course, but
the real-world dangers of such discrimination in identifying the press
are greatly muted because exclusion from that category does not leave
the speaker out in the constitutional cold. The relationship between
the two clauses, therefore, suggests not that we should presume that
the Speech Clause has absorbed the Press Clause, but rather that “the
press” has a distinct — albeit confined — meaning.
B. The Press Is Different
Accepting the premise that the Press Clause establishes a distinctive constitutional status for those who perform certain functions in
our democracy raises the question of how to identify those speakers.
Many thoughtful legal observers have addressed the question of who
constitutes “the press” for First Amendment purposes by seeking to
frame a definition. I, too, have used “definition” terminology frequently and, in fact, continue to do so on occasion even in this Article. Despite this common reference to a “definition,” however, perhaps the
more appropriate question is how to “identify” or “find” the press.
“Defining” the press suggests that some neutral arbiter (such as the
great Judge Hercules of Professor Ronald Dworkin’s jurisprudence53)
is hard at work carving out boundaries and creating distinctions where
they previously did not exist. “Identifying” or “finding” the press, on
the other hand, embraces practical distinctions that occur already in
the real world. My thesis is that there exists a naturally evolving subset of speakers who fulfill unique and constitutionally valuable press
functions. Thus, whereas a “definition” might draw static lines, a
“search” for these special speakers would logically change as their tools
and methods advance. The quest, therefore, should not be to define
the press but rather to train our courts to recognize them in action.
This section discusses some shared attributes of these speakers, and
Part III considers how we might go about finding them.
The bottom line is that press speakers are those who fulfill the
unique constitutional functions of the press, functions the Supreme
Court has identified — often in dicta — as gathering newsworthy information, disseminating it to the public, and serving as a check on the

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
51 See id. (explaining the modern “conflation of First Amendment rights” in which we have “the
worst of both worlds: a neglect of the ways in which First Amendment rights fit together and complement one another, and serious confusion over how each right is separately analyzed”).
52 West, supra note 23, at 1058–60.
53 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 239 (1986).
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government and powerful people.54 Occasional public commentators
might at times serve these functions, but the press has a commitment
to these roles that reaches far beyond sporadic or ineffective efforts.
Compared to occasional public commentators, the press tends to
possess distinct qualities. The press, for example, has knowledge, often specialized knowledge, about the subject matter at issue.55 The
press serves a gatekeeping function by making editorial decisions regarding what is or is not newsworthy.56 The press places news stories
in context locally, nationally, or over time.57 The press strives to convey important information in a timely manner.58 The press has accountability to its audience and gives attention to professional standards59 or ethics.60 The press devotes time and money to investigating
and reporting the news.61 It also expends significant resources defending itself against legal attacks as well as advocating for legal changes
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
54 West, supra note 22. For more analysis of the Supreme Court’s view of the press’s unique
constitutional functions, see generally id.
55 See EDMUND B. LAMBETH, COMMITTED JOURNALISM 25–26 (2d ed. 1992) (arguing that
reporters must become familiar with the subject areas they cover).
56 See Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (“A newspaper is more
than a passive receptacle or conduit for news, comment, and advertising. The choice of material to
go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to limitations on the size and content of the paper,
and treatment of public issues and public officials — whether fair or unfair — constitute the exercise of editorial control and judgment.” (footnote omitted)); David Carr, Local Papers Shine Light
in Society’s Dark Corners, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/10
/business/media/local-papers-shine-light-in-societys-dark-corners.html, archived at http://perma.cc
/D3ZX-K7US (detailing “the importance of local journalistic vigilance” in breaking the story of
New Jersey Governor Chris Christie’s office’s involvement in closing two lanes of access to the
George Washington Bridge, which led to a multi-hour traffic jam).
57 See BILL KOVACH & TOM ROSENSTIEL, THE ELEMENTS OF JOURNALISM 43–44 (2001)
(arguing that the press must provide context, as opposed to mere accuracy, in order to provide the audience with the full “journalistic truth,” id. at 43); id. at 145 (“Unless the [journalistic] forum is based
on a foundation of fact and context, the questions citizens ask will simply become rhetorical.”).
58 See Stephen Lacy et al., Citizen Journalism Web Sites Complement Newspapers, 31 NEWSPAPER RES. J. 34, 42 (2010), archived at http://perma.cc/4MLY-XMJP (“Only slightly more than a
quarter of the citizen news and blog sites published the same day they were visited, which indicates
most are not as timely as daily newspaper sites.”).
59 PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT INSTITUTIONS 146, 155 (2013) (“Before a story is
published, every line, every quote, every judgment call is subjected to checking and rechecking, debate and counter-debate, and institutional second guessing.” Id. at 155.).
60 See Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 365 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“The press
does have the right, which is its professional function, to criticize and to advocate. The whole gamut of public affairs is the domain for fearless and critical comment, and not least the administration
of justice. But the public function which belongs to the press makes it an obligation of honor to exercise this function only with the fullest sense of responsibility. Without such a lively sense of responsibility a free press may readily become a powerful instrument of injustice.”).
61 Chelsea Ide & Kanupriya Vashisht, Today’s Investigative Reporters Lack Resources,
AZCENTRAL.COM (May 28, 2006, 3:30 AM), http://www.azcentral.com/specials/special01
/0528bolles-stateofreporting.html?&wired, archived at http://perma.cc/CT7Q-KWTX (discussing
the amount of time and money reporters need to pursue investigative journalism).
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that foster information flow.62 And the press has a proven ability to
reach a broad audience through regular publication or broadcast.
For all of these reasons, members of the press, in contrast to occasional public commentators, would be best positioned to use potential
press rights in ways that would benefit society as a whole. Rights of
access to places, information, and sources, for example, help the press
inform the public and thereby check wrongdoing by powerful public
officials, private individuals, and entities.63
Acknowledging a distinction between the press and occasional public commentators does not, of course, entail allowing any new restrictions on the rights of any individual to speak. Occasional public
commentators are free — and should remain free — at all times to use
fully their constitutional speech rights. These rights of expression are
abundant and include the right to publish and disseminate their
speech. Contrary to the arguments of others, recognizing a special
measure of constitutional protection for the press does not require embracing a vision under which the press “will play an active role and
the audience a passive one.”64 The goal is to enhance the uniquely useful protections of this subset of speakers who have proven they will further certain societal goals, not to diminish the rights of other speakers.
Pretending that the press is no different than an army of individual
speakers with megaphones is a dangerous road to travel. In theory all
citizens armed with laptops and Internet connections might be able to
gather and convey news and check powerful government and private
interests. But the reality is that there are some speakers who do this
work far more consistently and effectively than others. And common
sense suggests that repeat-player specialists with proven track records
will do the most valuable work. It is true that public commentators
sometimes act like the press. But it is equally true that there exist
press speakers who operate differently and with significantly greater
impact than a mere collection of individuals exercising their speech
rights.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
62 See RonNell Andersen Jones, Litigation, Legislation, and Democracy in a Post-Newspaper
America, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 557, 559 (2011) (discussing “the critical, but underappreciated,
role that traditional media entities have played as legal instigators and enforcers”).
63 See Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991) (“The press plays a unique role as a check
on government abuse . . . .”); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 727 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(“As private and public aggregations of power burgeon in size . . . there is obviously a continuing
need for an independent press to disseminate a robust variety of information and opinion through
reportage, investigation, and criticism . . . .”); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539 (1965) (describing the
press as “a mighty catalyst in awakening public interest in governmental affairs, exposing corruption among public officers and employees and generally informing the citizenry of public events and
occurrences”).
64 Adam Cohen, The Media that Need Citizens: The First Amendment and the Fifth Estate, 85
S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 4 (2011) (calling this view a “common deficiency” of attempts to rescue the press).
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C. Why Finding the Press Matters
Our public debate has never seemed noisier. The marketplace of
ideas is overloaded with a cacophony of voices from both media and
nonmedia speakers. Thus, thanks to our robust speech rights, it might
appear that the courts’ inattention to the Press Clause is at most harmless error. Yet allowing the Press Clause to lie dormant does matter.
The impact is most obvious in the context of newsgathering. Despite recognition that “without some protection for seeking out the
news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated,”65 the Supreme Court
has extended to the press no protection for newsgathering. When analyzing tort violations such as trespass, fraud, or breach of duty of loyalty (common issues for undercover reporting), courts do not take into
account whether the defendant was a journalist pursuing a story.66
Reporters, likewise, are not protected from government subpoenas to
testify about their confidential sources, notes, or work product.67 They
likely have no constitutional defense against having their newsrooms
searched or their telephone records divulged.68 A journalist who receives leaked information from a source about a newsworthy matter
might be treated as a criminal.69
Members of the press also have unique needs for protection. They
have special concerns, for example, about becoming tools of the government or law enforcement.70 Forcing a member of the press to testify about personal observations or to reveal a confidential source to a
grand jury brings about greater harms than compelling a nonpress in-

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
65
66
67
68

Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681.
See, e.g., Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 1999).
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 667.
See, e.g., Mark Sherman, Gov’t Obtains Wide AP Phone Records in Probe, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (May 13, 2013, 10:53 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/govt-obtains-wide-ap-phone
-records-probe, archived at http://perma.cc/NLM4-SHXW (“The Justice Department secretly obtained two months of telephone records of reporters and editors for The Associated Press in what
the news cooperative’s top executive called a ‘massive and unprecedented intrusion’ into how news
organizations gather the news.”).
69 See, e.g., Brian Stelter & Michael D. Shear, Justice Dept. Investigated Fox Reporter
Over Leak, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/21/us/politics/white-house
-defends-tracking-fox-reporter.html, archived at http://perma.cc/6QDB-Z2AF (“Without naming
Mr. Rosen [the reporter being investigated], the document describes the reporter as ‘at the very
least, either as an aider, abettor and/or co-conspirator.’” (quoting Aff. in Support of Appl. for Search
Warrant at 27, In re Search of [Redacted], No. 1:10-mj-00291-AK (D.D.C. May 28, 2010), archived
at http://perma.cc/YB23-4ZEE)).
70 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (expressing concern over “state and
federal authorities . . . attempting to annex the journalistic profession as an investigative arm of
government”); Gonzales v. NBC, 194 F.3d 29, 35 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[P]ermitting litigants unrestricted,
court-enforced access to journalistic resources would risk the symbolic harm of making journalists
appear to be an investigative arm of the judicial system, the government, or private parties.”).
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dividual to do the same thing.71 According the government such a
power could transform journalists into de facto police investigators
whom prosecutors might summon at any time. Invocation of this
power also could dry up valuable sources of information, in part because effective use of confidential sources often requires development
of a trust-based relationship over time.72 Similar concerns also arise in
the civil context.73 These concerns suggest that there is a special case
to be made for protecting members of the press from subpoenas,
search warrants, and other intrusions that could burden their newsgathering and reporting efforts.
We can never really know, of course, what information the public
never received because of an absence of newsgathering protection.
But we do know that without press protections, journalists were unable to get information about detainees at Guantanamo Bay74 or gain
access to a jail where there were reports of cruel conditions and an
inmate suicide.75 We know that reporters have gone to jail for refusing
to reveal their sources76 and risk liability if they engage in undercover
reporting.77 A failure to protect newsgathering by the press not only
causes harm to those particular speakers but also imposes a shared
cost. Treating the press like all other speakers obstructs the public’s
right to know and impedes an important check on the government.
Concluding that the Press Clause has meaning independent of that
of the Speech Clause and that it is possible to identify press speakers
are the preliminary tasks. Accomplishing those tasks will allow us to
move on to the debate over what types of press rights and protections
make sense.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
71 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 728–36 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (outlining harm of subjecting journalists to unrestricted subpoena power).
72 See id. at 729 (noting that “the promise of confidentiality may be a necessary prerequisite to a
productive relationship between a newsman and his informants” because they “may be willing to
relate that information only in confidence to a reporter whom [they] trust[]”).
73 See Gonzales, 194 F.3d at 35 (explaining the concern that if the press had no protection against
civil subpoenas, “[t]he resulting wholesale exposure of press files to litigant scrutiny would burden the
press with heavy costs of subpoena compliance, and could otherwise impair its ability to perform its
duties — particularly if potential sources were deterred from speaking to the press, or insisted on remaining anonymous, because of the likelihood that they would be sucked into litigation”).
74 See Associated Press v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 554 F.3d 274, 279 (2d Cir. 2009).
75 See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 14–16 (1978).
76 See Paying the Price: A Recent Census of Reporters Jailed or Fined for Refusing to Testify,
REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, http://www.rcfp.org/jailed
-journalists (last visited May 10, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/XQ6F-PJVZ.
77 See, e.g., Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 510 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that journalists who lied on employment applications to gain access to private facilities or used
secret cameras for newsgathering activities are not protected by the First Amendment and may be
liable for trespass or other offenses).
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II. DOES CHANGING TECHNOLOGY CHANGE THE PRESS?
Finding the press in a sea of sundry speakers is not without its
complications. Advances in communication technology that make it
simpler and cheaper to share information widely are escalating the
challenge. This section considers the impact of this new technology on
the search for the press and concludes that it helps, not hinders, the
quest by focusing our attention on the unique functions of the press
and by reducing concerns of elitism.
A. Technology Focuses the Search for the Press
It is now easier than ever for the occasional public commentator to
act at times as a casual journalist. The Supreme Court has observed
that thanks to “the advent of the Internet and the decline of print and
broadcast media . . . the line between the media and others who wish
to comment on political and social issues becomes far more blurred.”78
These technological developments suggest to some that our view of the
press should be expanding with no less rapidity than technological
change.79
There is a tendency to throw up one’s hands in contemplating the
impact of new technologies on the Press Clause. The Court, after all,
has long had an uneasy relationship with the Clause, and new technologies seem to render claims for invigorating it messier than ever before. Yet the age of the Internet, bloggers, smartphones, and social

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
78
79

Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 905–06 (2010).
See id.; see also SCOTT GANT, WE’RE ALL JOURNALISTS NOW 6 (2007) (“Although we are
not all engaged in the practice of journalism, anyone of us can be if we want to [due in part to technological advances]. In that respect, we’re all journalists now.”); David A. Anderson, Freedom of
the Press, 80 TEX. L. REV. 429, 528 (2002) (“[I]t is difficult to distinguish the press from the rest because the press is ‘disappearing inside the larger world of communications.’” (quoting KOVACH &
ROSENSTIEL, supra note 57, at 11)); W. Lance Bennett, The Twilight of Mass Media News: Markets, Citizenship, Technology, and the Future of Journalism, in FREEING THE PRESSES 111, 112
(Timothy E. Cook ed., 2005) (“Today, anyone with a computer or a mobile phone is a potential reporter and publisher.”); Cohen, supra note 64, at 3 (describing the rise of “an Internet-based Fifth
Estate” where “anyone with a computer and Internet access can produce and disseminate news”);
Mary-Rose Papandrea, Citizen Journalism and the Reporter’s Privilege, 91 MINN. L. REV. 515,
519–20 (2007) (arguing that a qualified testimonial privilege “should extend to anyone . . . disseminating information to the public,” id. at 520); Keith Werhan, Essay, Rethinking
Freedom of the Press After 9/11, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1561, 1601 n.243 (2008) (favoring a definition of
the press that includes “anyone who regularly gathers and disseminates information of public interest to the public”). But see West, supra note 23, at 1056–58 (explaining why a broad definition of the
press leads to less robust protection of constitutional rights); but cf. Houchins, 438 U.S. at 5 (citing
concern that expansive media access would “undermine jail security”); Hamburger, supra note 49,
at 838 (noting concerns “that an enlarged definition of any right may invite limitations on the circumstances in which it is available”).
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media is an especially good time to tackle this issue. Advances in mass
communication might blur the lines between the press and everyone
else, but they also offer an incentive to pinpoint with heightened specificity the distinctive functions the press performs in our democracy.
Better understanding of those functions, in turn, helps to frame rules —
including rules that reach beyond the Speech Clause — that ensure
that those functions are carried out.
There was a time, for example, when how speakers communicated
was a convenient proxy for who is and who is not the press, but that
time is no longer.80 In the past, identifiers such as affiliation with an
established news organization or use of traditional media — television,
radio, or newspapers — were relatively precise indicators. Nonpress
speakers rarely had access to these modes of communication, and press
speakers had no alternatives for reaching mass audiences. Today,
however, nearly every established news media organization has a web
site and disseminates news via electronic services such as Twitter and
Facebook. Increasingly, news publishers provide online services only
and no longer have print editions,81 while many others are cutting
back on the amount of content put into print in favor of web-based
dissemination.82 At the same time, however, hundreds of millions of
speakers use blogs, social media, and similar means of communicating
even though they are not functioning as the press.83 The Court itself
observed that constantly evolving technology meant that any businessstructure or medium-based definition of the press “would likely be
born an anachronism.”84 An approach that accords press status to everyone engaged in online communication would fall short of effectively
identifying only those speakers fulfilling press functions.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
80 See LEE C. BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS 85, 108–20 (1991) (describing past approaches as “partial regulation,” id. at 116, of the press depending on the medium involved).
81 Slate Magazine is one such example. See SLATE, http://www.slate.com (last visited May 10,
2014), archived at http://perma.cc/8J2U-GYCD.
82 See Sarah Frier & Edmund Lee, Newsweek to Become Online-Only After 80 Years in Print,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 18, 2012, 3:29 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-18/newsweek-to
-become-online-only-after-80-years-in-print.html, archived at http://perma.cc/73PT-RBSA (reporting on
Newsweek’s move to an all-digital publication); Dan Reimold, Revolution in Georgia: Student Newspaper Goes Digital First, PBS (Aug. 18, 2011), http://www.pbs.org/mediashift/2011/08/revolution-in
-georgia-student-newspaper-goes-digital-first230.html, archived at http://perma.cc/QD9Z-MNQZ (describing University of Georgia’s student newspaper’s move to a primarily online publication).
83 See Facebook Reaches Majority of US Web Users, EMARKETER (Feb. 24, 2011), http://www
.emarketer.com/%28S%28rt15q0euzflupcbj2u1lkpnp%29%29/Article/Facebook-Reaches-Majority
-of-US-Web-Users/1008247, archived at http://perma.cc/457F-C2NT (“By 2013, 62% of web users
and almost half (47.6%) of the overall US population will be on Facebook.”).
84 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 782 (1985); id. at 782 n.7.
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Modern communication technology makes it evident that a less
static understanding of the press is needed. That understanding,
moreover, should be rooted in what the press actually does. The explosion of technology has changed the way everyone creates and receives information. But — and this is the key point — it has not eliminated the vital functional roles played by the press in our society. The
Internet is having the positive effect of focusing attention on the key
functional criteria of press membership — that is, by directing attention to assessing who is truly carrying out the role of the press.85
B. Embracing Press Exceptionalism but Not Elitism
New technologies also have diminished the risks of elitism. One
longstanding objection to embracing press exceptionalism is that it requires giving special rights to a few, already privileged speakers.86 This
concern is, at its core, one of speaker-based discrimination. The worry is
that only certain types of primarily elite speakers will be considered part
of the press and, therefore, only certain messages or viewpoints will receive, as a practical matter, heightened constitutional protections.87
This concern is valid. But the concern’s alleviation does not require that every speaker be considered a member of the press. The objective should not be to treat all speakers equally regardless of whether
they are fulfilling press functions, but rather to ensure equal opportunity for all speakers to be recognized as the press if deserved. And
modern technology helps everyone in this regard by easing the path to
constitutional press status.
The case against recognizing unique press rights is often rooted in
the concept that the Constitution protects fringe speakers and messages
that depart from the orthodox, sometimes even wildly so. This nearabsolutist approach that we apply to speech has trained us to bristle at
the notion of giving anyone “special” First Amendment protections.88
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
85
86

See discussion infra section III.A, pp. 2454.
See First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 802 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring)
(“[T]he purpose of the Constitution was not to erect the press into a privileged institution but to protect all persons in their right to print what they will as well as to utter it.” (quoting Pennekamp v.
Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 364 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)) (alteration in original) (internal quotation mark omitted)); see also Clay Calvert, And You Call Yourself a Journalist?: Wrestling with a
Definition of “Journalist” in the Law, 103 DICK. L. REV. 411, 413 (1999) (expressing concern that a
narrow definition creates an “elite, protected class”).
87 See Anderson, supra note 79, at 479 (“In the case of the press, the decisions are made by a selfappointed elite.”); Mike Godwin, Who’s a Journalist? — II: Welcome the New Journalists on the
Internet, 13 MEDIA STUD. J. 38, 38–39, 42 (1999) (advocating the end of special privileges for the
established press); West, supra note 23, at 1054–55 (recognizing that some scholars fear and call for
an end of the elite press).
88 Anderson, supra note 79, at 529 (describing this negative view of unique press rights — which
he does not share — as “the tyranny of a self-appointed elite that depicts the world through its own
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Yet acknowledging the existence of press speakers who fill particular functional roles and identifying those who best satisfy those roles is
not the same as being nonegalitarian. Developing such distinctions is
common practice in constitutional law. In defamation law, for example, we divide plaintiffs between public officials,89 public figures,90 and
nonpublic figures.91 Depending on one’s classification, different constitutional rules apply. The law thus recognizes that different people
play different roles in our society. Distinguishing between press defamation defendants and nonpress defamation defendants would operate
in a similar way.92
The functional role provided by the press centers on its role as
watchdog of the powerful and as conduit of newsworthy information.93
Identifying those speakers who are best suited to fill these roles, and
providing them with rights that would help them pursue these endeavors, is not elitist. In fact, it is just the opposite. The press serves
as a check on the most elite members of our society — high-ranking
government officials and private but powerful figures — by gathering
and supplying the general public with critical information about them.
The key is making sure that there is equal access to recognition as
a member of the press. As long as all speakers can gain the qualifications of press identification regardless of their message or their identity,
inequality concerns are unfounded. In opposing efforts to provide special privileges for the press, Chief Justice Burger reasoned that “the
First Amendment does not ‘belong’ to any definable category of persons or entities: It belongs to all who exercise its freedoms.”94 But
Chief Justice Burger’s line of thinking about the First Amendment
begs the question because we must ask how we “exercise its freedoms.”

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
filter, tr[ying] to tell people what they need to know, and bedevil[ing] their elected officials and their
celebrities in the names of their right to know”).
89 See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (requiring public officials to
prove actual malice to recover for defamation).
90 Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164–65 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring in the result)
(applying “actual malice” test to public figures); see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,
335–36 (1974) (recognizing that Curtis Publishing extended the “actual malice” rule to public
figures).
91 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 348–50 (requiring nonpublic plaintiffs to prove at least negligence to
recover for actual injury when speech relates to a matter of public concern, and to prove actual malice to recover punitive damages); cf. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S.
749, 757–61 (1985) (holding that when defamatory speech does not involve a matter of public concern, a plaintiff can recover without any showing of fault).
92 To date, the U.S. Supreme Court has not addressed whether press defendants should be treated differently than nonpress defendants in defamation cases. See Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,
475 U.S. 767, 779 n.4 (1986).
93 See West, supra note 22, at 40–44.
94 First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 802 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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His statement is consistent with an approach to the Press Clause that
identifies the press as a subset of all speakers. If Press Clause protection goes to everyone who is exercising its freedoms in the sense of fulfilling the functions the Clause is meant to encourage, then it remains
both an egalitarian and a theoretically consistent provision.
As with restrictions on speech, the limits imposed by the Press
Clause must account for the potential for content- or speaker-based
discrimination. Concern about such discrimination should take center
stage, instead of some vague concern about favoring certain “elites.”
Identifying the press in a way that looks for those members who are
best fulfilling the unique roles of the press in society leaves ample
room for minority, nontraditional, and outlying speakers to receive
Press Clause protection.
Advances in mass communication technology, meanwhile, have
opened the gates to press membership wider than ever before. By
making it cheaper and easier for all speakers to reach large audiences,
the Internet has eliminated many barriers to fulfilling press functions.95 No longer must a speaker be affiliated with a formal news organization or have a broadcast license or access to a printing press to
effectively function as the press.
Even with these technological advances, gathering news and publishing to a mass audience is, of course, not costless. While more accessible than ever before, the technology still requires resources, and
the act of gathering and reporting news takes time that will burden
some speakers more than others. Publishing, however, has always had
its costs, as the Framers well knew. Colonial-era printing required
money, labor, and often-scarce supplies.96 Access to information and a
delivery system were also barriers to printing,97 as were the basics of
literacy.98 In short, exercising press freedoms has always required spe-

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
95 Anthony Ciolli, Bloggers as Public Figures, 16 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 255, 260 (2007)
(“[A]nybody with a computer, an internet connection, and a cheap or free blogging program can become an amateur journalist and immediately have access to an international audience.”); Jay M.
Zitter, Annotation, First Amendment Protection Afforded to Blogs and Bloggers, 35 A.L.R.6th 407,
§ 1 (2008) (“Blogs, short for ‘Web logs,’ are an increasingly popular form of interactive Web sites,
since an individual can reach a potentially huge audience with a relatively small investment of time
and energy.”).
96 See LAWRENCE C. WROTH, THE COLONIAL PRINTER 233 (1931) (“This high mortality
among the newspapers can be best accounted for by . . . the difficulty experienced at various times
and places of securing a steady supply of reasonably cheap paper.”).
97 See JOHN CLYDE OSWALD, PRINTING IN THE AMERICAS 30 (1937) (“Most of the printing
offices were located at the seat of the provincial governments . . . .”).
98 See LAWRENCE A. CREMIN, TRADITIONS OF AMERICAN EDUCATION 31–32 (1977) (distinguishing between “inert” or technical literacy and “liberating literacy” and using newspaper circulations to suggest an increase in the latter in the eighteenth century).
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cial investment, talents, and effort. The idea that some will have an
easier path to exercising their rights is not a foreign concept to our
Constitution.99 It should invigorate, rather than diminish, the case for
legal rights for the press, however, that the costs of gaining press
membership are drastically decreasing.
Under the guidelines for identifying the press that I outline in Part
III below, moving from occasional public commentator to press member would require the establishment of diverse criteria. The paths for
a speaker to gain recognition as a member of the press are many and
varied. A speaker can attain press status through some combination of
institutional recognition, education, work history, publication record,
established audience, and possibly other means. Recognizing this diversity of pathways lessens concerns about the monopolization of privileges by an advantaged elite.
III. DEVELOPING A WORKABLE PATH
FOR FINDING THE PRESS
Columbia University President Lee C. Bollinger has described
“[t]he definitional problem — who constitutes ‘the press’” as
“seem[ingly] intractable.”100 I disagree. The problems posed by defining “the press” are not qualitatively different than the problems posed
by defining terms found in other provisions of the Constitution. It is,
of course, not necessary that a magic “sorting hat”101 appear before the
Press Clause can take effect. As they have done in other areas of the
law, the courts can and should apply constitutional principles via an
organizational process that unfolds over time.102
Many, if not most cases that involve claimed press membership
would not be hard to resolve.103 But there will be, as always, gray ar–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
99 See Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 780 (2011) (holding that criminal defendant lawyer’s failure to introduce any expert evidence did not violate defendant’s constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 423 (1990) (upholding parental
notification requirements for minors seeking abortions despite evidence that such requirements
place particular burdens on minors and the poor); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976) (per
curiam) (“[R]estrict[ing] the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative
voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment.”).
100 LEE C. BOLLINGER, UNINHIBITED, ROBUST, AND WIDE-OPEN: A FREE PRESS FOR A
NEW CENTURY 53 (2010).
101 See J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE SORCERER’S STONE 117 (1999).
102 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 225 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“All new
laws, though penned with the greatest technical skill and passed on the fullest and most mature deliberation, are considered as more or less obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated
and ascertained by a series of particular discussions and adjudications.”).
103 See Floyd Abrams, The Press Is Different: Reflections on Justice Stewart and the Autonomous Press, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 563, 580 (1979) (“In the great preponderance of cases, a court has
little difficulty knowing a journalist when it sees one.”).
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eas. That does not mean that courts should give up on interpretation.
As Professor Frederick Schauer observed: “[C]ategorization is the only
way in which we can organize and negotiate an overwhelming world
whose vast array of particulars demands that it be sorted into
categories.”104
A. The Press Is as the Press Does
The primary goal in our search for the press is to identify those
speakers who are fulfilling particular constitutional functions. Thus,
distinguishing the press from the occasional public commentator requires asking whether the speaker is carrying out the unique roles of
the press. Focusing on the functional roles is both constitutionally
based and allows for standards to adapt over time.
Many scholarly105 and legislative106 attempts to define the press
have adopted a functional approach.107 The problem is that these definitions tend to be overinclusive by embracing a broad view of the
press as encompassing anyone who gathers or disseminates information to the public. Or, if they try to pinpoint press activities more
specifically, they risk being underinclusive and overlooking alternative
journalists by mirroring too heavily the actions of the traditional
media.109
108

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
104 Frederick Schauer, Institutions as Legal and Constitutional Categories, 54 UCLA L. REV.
1747, 1748 (2007).
105 See, e.g., Randall P. Bezanson, The Developing Law of Editorial Judgment, 78 NEB. L. REV.
754, 829 (1999) (advocating a “purpose-oriented definition”); Paul Horwitz, Or of the [Blog], 11
NEXUS 45, 52 (2006) (“The medium by which [blog-based] journalism is disseminated to the public
matters far less than the fact that an individual has deliberately gathered and disseminated newsworthy facts.”); Robert D. Sack, Reflections on the Wrong Question: Special Constitutional Privilege for the Institutional Press, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 629, 629 (1979) (“[A]ll citizens exercising the
press function, including, but not limited to, journalists employed by the ‘institutional press,’ warrant [constitutional] protection.”); Erik Ugland & Jennifer Henderson, Who Is a Journalist and Why
Does It Matter? Disentangling the Legal and Ethical Arguments, 22 J. MASS MEDIA ETHICS 241,
247 (2007) (identifying the “egalitarian” definition of the press “in which all citizens are equally
equipped and equally free to serve as newsgathering watchdogs”).
106 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 595.023 (2012) (protecting any “person who is or has been directly
engaged in the gathering, procuring, compiling, editing, or publishing of information for the purpose of transmission, dissemination or publication to the public”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.11(a)(1)
(2013) (protecting “[a]ny person . . . engaged in the business of gathering, compiling, writing, editing,
photographing, recording, or processing information for dissemination via any news medium”).
107 See also Chevron Corp. v. Berlinger, 629 F.3d 297, 308 (2d Cir. 2011) (concluding a filmmaker
was not the press for reporter’s privilege purposes because he was not functioning as the press “in its
valuable public service of seeking out and revealing truthful information”).
108 See, e.g., Werhan, supra note 79, at 1601 n.243 (favoring a definition of the press that includes
“anyone who regularly gathers and disseminates information of public interest to the public”).
109 See, e.g., Papandrea, supra note 79, at 583 (arguing that some functional criteria could overly
favor the traditional mainstream media).

2014]

PRESS EXCEPTIONALISM

2455

I propose instead that we look to the Supreme Court to determine
the constitutional roles of the press. In another piece, I concluded that
the Court in its opinions has pinpointed two unique functions of the
press.110 These are to act as surrogates for and conduits of news to the
public, and to serve as a check on the government and the powerful.111
The goal is to recognize protections for those who are most effectively
fulfilling these roles in our society.
B. Hosanna-Tabor: A Helpful Model
The Supreme Court recently provided a helpful model demonstrating how to identify a group of distinct constitutional rightsholders in
its unanimous 2012 decision,112 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran
Church and School v. EEOC.113 In that case, the Court was tasked
with deciding whether a parochial school teacher was a “minister” for
purposes of the “ministerial exception” to certain employment discrimination laws that derives from the Free Exercise Clause.114
The Court in Hosanna-Tabor was focused on a different First
Amendment provision, of course, but its analysis promises to have
broad and significant implications.115 By holding that certain religious
actors may claim First Amendment protections that other individuals
and organizations may not, the Court embraced the concept that subsets of constitutional actors exist and can be identified. The relevance
of the case to the search for the press is clear: the Court needed to and
was able to distinguish those who were functioning with a protected
constitutional purpose from those who were in a similar position but
did not merit constitutional protection.
As I am proposing here, the Court in Hosanna-Tabor emphasized a
functional inquiry. The Court examined the teacher’s actions for signs
that she was discharging the “important religious functions”116 of a
minister. It was not necessary, the Court held, that the teacher “per–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
110
111
112

West, supra note 22.
Id.
All nine Justices joined the majority opinion of Hosanna-Tabor, but Justices Thomas and
Alito wrote separate concurrences, and Justice Kagan joined the latter concurrence.
113 132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).
114 Id. at 699.
115 See Michael W. McConnell, Reflections on Hosanna-Tabor, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 821,
836–37 (2012) (suggesting that it “may be the broader doctrinal implications of Hosanna-Tabor that
have the most lasting significance,” id. at 837); Zoë Robinson, What is a “Religious Institution”?, 55
B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 1) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library)
(calling the decision a “jurisprudential earthquake” whose “biggest aftershock has yet to be felt”).
116 Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 708; see also id. at 714–15 (noting that the teacher taught scripture to her students, led daily prayer and devotional exercises, and occasionally led a school-wide
religious service, which included “choosing liturgies, hymns, and readings, and composing and delivering a message based on Scripture,” id. at 715).
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form exclusively religious functions,”117 and while the amount of time
she spent on religious activities was “relevant,” it was not alone
determinative.118
Equally remarkable in Hosanna-Tabor is what the Court did not
do. The Court did not conclude that the lack of a precise definition of
“minister”119 should deter it from dealing with a conflict between generally applicable employment discrimination laws and “the text of the
First Amendment itself, which gives special solicitude to the rights of
religious organizations.”120 The Court further did not feel compelled
to draft an all-encompassing definition that would satisfy every conceivable hypothetical situation, stating instead that it was “reluctant . . . to adopt a rigid formula for deciding when an employee qualifies as a minister.”121 The Court freed itself to proceed slowly on a
case-by-case basis, declaring that “[i]t is enough for us to conclude”
that the teacher in this case satisfied the exception.122
In its analysis, the Court in Hosanna-Tabor did not purport to create any official test or formal elements of a legal definition. The
Court’s discussion instead highlighted certain attributes about the
teacher involved in that case. No single factor appeared to be decisive. My proposal below envisions much the same approach for identifying the press.
C. Guidelines for Identifying the Press
This section draws from the Hosanna-Tabor factors, as well as insights from past attempts by legislatures to define the press,123 in order
to identify reliable proxies and signals that will lead the courts to those
speakers who best fulfill the unique constitutional functions of the
press.124 My analysis suggests that the following considerations are of
the greatest importance: (1) recognition by others as the press; (2) holding oneself out as the press; (3) training, education, or experience in
journalism; and (4) regularity of publication and established audience.
1. Recognition as the Press. — In Hosanna-Tabor, the Court relied
on the fact that the church recognized the teacher “as a minister, with
a role distinct from that of most of its members.”125 The Court point–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
117 Id. at 708 (quoting Brief for Federal Respondent at 51, Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. 708 (No.
10-553)).
118 Id. at 709.
119 See id. at 707.
120 Id. at 706.
121 Id. at 707.
122 Id.
123 See West, supra note 23, at 1062–68 (examining legislative definitions of the press).
124 Cf. generally Robinson, supra note 115 (offering a purposivist framework for defining a “religious institution” after Hosanna-Tabor).
125 Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707.
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ed to a title she had been given as a “called” as opposed to a “lay”
teacher126 and noted that the church referred to her as a “commissioned minister.”127 The teacher’s job description included “ministerial
responsibilities” and the requirement that she continue her education
as a professional in the ministry. In other words, the Court’s analysis
suggests that we know she is likely a minister because the church labeled her one.
A similar approach to the press would go a long way (although not
all the way) toward separating speakers who merit constitutional designation as press members from occasional public commentators. Employment by a news organization with a job description or title of “reporter,” “editor,” “photojournalist,” or the like would signal a level of
seriousness that corresponds with the Press Clause’s goals. Membership in professional organizations would also be informative, as would
an award of press credentials by a governmental entity or private
organization.
There is no doubt that tying press membership to affiliations with
a media company or press credentials would leave out some important
speakers who are fulfilling press functions. That does not mean, however, that these traditional indicators of press membership are without
value. News organizations, professional journalism societies, and
groups that offer various types of press credentials reflect public norms
regarding which speakers best fulfill the functions of the press.129 In
addition, these organizations do not operate in the shadows. They are
accountable to the public, self-regulating, self-correcting, and sensitive
about adapting to changing times.130 In other words, these organizations can do much of the heavy lifting in singling out press members,
and it would be imprudent to ignore them.
Institutional theorists suggest that societies should be left to build
institutions as they see fit, and the courts should then look to those in128

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
126
127
128
129

Id. at 699.
Id. at 708.
Id. at 707.
See Lacy et al., supra note 58, at 34, 42 (“[D]ata indicate that citizen journalism Web sites
(news and blog sites) are generally not acceptable substitutes for daily newspaper Web sites.”); Pew
Research Center’s Journalism Project Staff, How News Happens: A Study of the News Ecosystem of One American City, PEW RES. JOURNALISM PROJECT (Jan. 11, 2010), http://www
.journalism.org/2010/01/11/how-news-happens, archived at http://perma.cc/D57P-KDAS (discussing an empirical study of Baltimore’s “news ecosystem” and noting that “of the stories that did contain new information nearly all, 95%, came from traditional media — most of them newspapers”).
130 See, e.g., Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 117 (1973)
(“The power of a privately owned newspaper to advance its own . . . views is bounded by only two
factors: first, the acceptance of a sufficient number of readers — and hence advertisers — to assure
financial success; and, second, the journalistic integrity of its editors and publishers.”).
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stitutions as guides in interpreting the law.131 The Court has not heretofore taken this approach. Indeed, Schauer has argued that “the refusal of the Supreme Court to treat the press as different despite its
identifiably distinct institutional status is part of a larger pattern of
treating First Amendment doctrine as institutionally blind.”132
Relying on third-party recognition of the press would allow us to
capitalize in a commonsense fashion on information gleaned in the real
world. It is noteworthy that journalism has developed into a recognized profession organized in part around professional societies, credentialing systems, and formally structured news organizations. These
institutions of working journalists have developed practical understandings as to who is and who is not functioning as the press.133 In
fact, the press might be one of the most natural places to rely on the
structural guidelines that already exist.134 The press as an institution,
according to Professor Paul Horwitz, “is identifiable and long established; it is a major part of the infrastructure of public discourse; it follows its own norms, practices, and self-regulatory standards; and it is
fully (if imperfectly) capable of acting autonomously.”135 Thus, by credentialing, hiring, conferring degrees upon, or in other ways recognizing individuals as the press, journalistic institutions give us important
cues regarding who is serving the core purposes of the press.
They also, however, raise concerns of favoring certain speakers
over others. Nontraditional news sources run the risk of being left out
even as they are operating to fulfill press functions. Guidelines established by professional organizations may be skewed in a manner that
burdens particular messages or viewpoints to a greater degree than
would rules forged by detached and politically insulated courts.
A look to press institutions, therefore, can begin — but must not
end — the inquiry.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
131 See Paul Horwitz, Churches as First Amendment Institutions: Of Sovereignty and Spheres, 44
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 87 (2009) (asserting that an institutionally sensitive approach “understand[s] that some speech institutions are key contributors to our system of public discourse and
that ‘the freedom of expression is not only enjoyed by and through, but also depends on the existence and flourishing of,’ these institutions” (quoting Richard W. Garnett, Do Churches Matter? Towards an Institutional Understanding of the Religion Clauses, 53 VILL. L. REV. 273, 274 (2008))).
132 Schauer, supra note 104, at 1754. But see First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
798 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (“The Court has not yet squarely resolved whether the Press
Clause confers upon the ‘institutional press’ any freedom from government restraint not enjoyed by
all others.”).
133 HORWITZ, supra note 59, at 165 (stating that courts should “focus on whether a given entity
was a journalistic entity engaging in the act of journalism, subject to the norms, traditions, and selfregulating practices that characterize the press”).
134 See Horwitz, supra note 105, at 58 (“If we think of the First Amendment in institutional
terms, the Press Clause is obviously the most natural, most textually rooted place to find some form
of institutional autonomy for what we might label the conventional working press.”).
135 HORWITZ, supra note 59, at 146.
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2. Identification as the Press. — In addition to looking to thirdparty recognition of the press, courts can also take note of whether the
speaker has identified himself as the press. In Hosanna-Tabor, the
Court looked to evidence that the teacher had “held herself out as a
minister of the Church” by claiming special privileges and making a
statement referring to herself as a minister.136 Regardless of affiliation
with or recognition by a news organization, evidence that a speaker
claims a role as the press would be instructive (although rarely decisive), and would lessen the risk of an overly elitist definition.
Relying solely on self-identification as the press would, of course,
allow too many occasional public commentators to label themselves as
the press. As the New Jersey Supreme Court has recognized: “[S]elfappointed journalists or entities with little track record who claim the
[reporter’s] privilege require more scrutiny.”137
Nonetheless, as with the self-titled minister in Hosanna-Tabor, evidence that a speaker has self-identified as the press does provide some
useful information regarding possible press membership. An established history of holding oneself out as a member of the press might
provide insight into the speaker’s intentions.138 Similarly, it could reveal whether others presumed the speaker was a member of the press
and relied on that representation.139 Acknowledging a proven history
of self-identification as the press would leave open the possibility for
many speakers to earn a designation as the press while also weeding
out those who might claim the title sporadically or pretextually.140
3. Training, Education, or Experience. — In Hosanna-Tabor, the
Court also pointed to the teacher’s religious training and continuing
education as a minister.141 These factors would also be helpful for
identifying the press. Many members of the press today have studied
journalism formally, have been trained as part of a mentorship, or

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
136 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 707 (2012); id.
at 708.
137 Too Much Media, LLC v. Hale, 20 A.3d 364, 383 (N.J. 2011).
138 See Von Bulow v. Von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 145 (2d Cir. 1987) (denying the press privilege to
someone who did not have the intent to publish the information she was collecting at the time she
collected the information, stating, “the talisman invoking the journalist’s privilege is intent to disseminate to the public at the time the gathering of information commences”).
139 Reporters are frequently denied the protections of the privilege if they conceal the fact that
they are a reporter from their source. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21a(h) (West 2012) (“‘In
the course of pursuing his professional activities’ . . . does not include any situation in which a reporter intentionally conceals from the source the fact that he is a reporter . . . .”).
140 See In re Madden, 151 F.3d 125, 130 (3d Cir. 1998) (“Although Madden proclaims himself to
be ‘Pro Wrestling’s only real journalist,’ hyperbolic self-proclamation will not suffice as proof that
an individual is a journalist.”).
141 Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 707.
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have built a history of experience through independent journalistic
activity.142
There is some overlap here with other factors. When a journalism
school educates a student and confers a degree in “journalism,” it is
providing institutional identification of a speaker as the press.143 So
too with the speaker who has been hired, trained, or mentored by an
established news organization. Likewise, a speaker who has a track
record of experience in journalistic activity also can show that she has
been functioning as the press and perhaps can point to regularity of
publication and an established audience.144
4. Regularity of Publication or Established Audience. — Finally,
courts should consider the regularity of publication or a showing of an
established readership.145 Some legislative approaches take these factors into account. The journalist shield laws in both Indiana and Illinois, for example, cover those who publish “at regular intervals” and
have “a general circulation.”146
Examining how often a speaker publishes and to whom the publication is directed is helpful in identifying the press for several reasons.
First, and most importantly, the factors of publication and circulation
record relate closely with the unique functions of the press qua press.
Of particular importance, effectively disseminating news to the public
requires actually reaching the public. Speakers likewise cannot be said
to impose a check on either government or powerful nongovernmental
figures if the conversation occurs in a vacuum.
A proven track record of publication similarly correlates with devoting time and resources to informing the public and scrutinizing the
powerful. An isolated or sporadic publication might further these
functions, but at best it does so marginally. It is those speakers who
return to the marketplace of news again and again who best serve the
roles of a rigorous and vigilant press. Thus, regularly communicating
with a broad audience is a necessary, although not always sufficient,
qualification to fulfill the press’s informing and checking functions.
Regularity of publication is a useful device for separating the press
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
142 See Ide & Vashisht, supra note 61 (quoting David Boardman, managing editor of The Seattle
Times and president of Investigative Reporters and Editors, the nation’s foremost organization devoted to investigative reporting, who stated: “To do good investigative journalism, you need training, and a lot of these are sophisticated skills that if there’s nobody to teach it, nobody will know
how to do it”).
143 See supra section III.C.1, pp. 2456–58.
144 See infra section III.C.4, pp. 2460–62.
145 See Linda L. Berger, Shielding the Unmedia: Using the Process of Journalism to Protect the
Journalist’s Privilege in an Infinite Universe of Publication, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 1371, 1411–12 (2003)
(defining journalism in part by asking whether information is “regularly disseminated,” id. at 1412).
146 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/8-902(B) (2012); IND. CODE § 34-46-4-1(1)(A) (2013).
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from occasional public commentators who act sporadically in a presslike manner but who are not repeat players committing time and resources to press functions.147
Second, regularity of publication and the existence of an established
audience ensure accountability for the press. The Court has recognized that one of the only limits on the press is “the acceptance of a
sufficient number of readers — and hence advertisers — to assure financial success.”148 Without the demands of regular readers, we lose
an important check on the press. Those speakers who publish regularly and have a following also can more readily correct errors, follow up
on stories, and provide context across topics. Any potential risks of
recognizing constitutional rights and privileges of the press are lessened by the responsibility that comes with having a reputation built on
a publication record and answering to an established readership.
Third, an established publication track record and substantial circulation helps to weed out pretextual claims. The objective is to separate those speakers opportunistically claiming to be the press while
avoiding an approach that favors only the elite. An inquiry into the
publication record and the scope of an audience addresses these concerns. A speaker who is pretextually asserting press status in order to
claim, for example, a right of access or testimonial privilege would almost always be unable to show a consistent publication record or a following by a meaningful audience. A publication record reflects a dedication to distribution of the news that almost by definition is not a
quality of the occasional public commentator.
Finally, using regularity of publication and established readership
as a means to find the press also addresses concerns of elitism. As we
have seen, advances in mass communication technology have made it
easier and cheaper for most speakers to publish to a broad audience.149
The explosion of bloggers exemplifies this phenomenon. While not all
bloggers function as the press, those who do often provide valuable
vantage points that differ from the traditional media. Any constitutional recognition of the press needs to embrace these diverse speakers
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
147 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 4320(4)(a) (2013) (specifying that to be a “reporter” for the
purposes of the state’s reporter’s privilege law, one must “earn[] his or her principal livelihood by, or
in each of the preceding 3 weeks or 4 of the preceding 8 weeks [have] spent at least 20 hours engaged
in the practice of, obtaining or preparing information for dissemination with the aid of facilities for
the mass reproduction of words, sounds, or images in a form available to the general public”). For
membership purposes, the Society of Professional Journalists considers anyone who spends more
than half of their time working as a journalist or journalism educator to be a “professional journalist.” Become an SPJ Member, SOC’Y OF PROF’L JOURNALISTS, https://www.spj.org/whyjoin5
.asp (last visited May 10, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/E4JX-DYLU.
148 Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 117 (1973); accord Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 255 (1974).
149 See supra section II.A, pp. 2448–50.
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equally with those representing more mainstream approaches. Giving
attention to the speaker’s publication record and the expansiveness of
an audience serves this goal.
Under the methodology proposed here, virtually anyone can become a member of the press. At the same time, not everyone with a
smartphone or laptop will make the cut. Being a member of the press
is a role that no speaker is born into and few can attain overnight; rather, such membership comes with the exertion of effort over time.
The Court in Hosanna-Tabor signaled a similar view as to attaining
the status of “minister.” By relying on experience, training, and past
identification as a minister, the Justices indicated comfort with a
framework that emphasizes past activities to establish a place in a constitutional category. While the focus is on function, examination of external cues guides the way. Someone with no training or experience
who does not regularly connect with a congregation is not likely to be
much of a minister. By the same token, according press rights to neophytes and dabblers will do little to further the functional goals the
Press Clause was meant to serve.
IV. CONCLUSION
With the explosion of technology, we all now have at our fingertips
the power to convey information broadly. This newfound ability to
speak with each other is immensely valuable, which is why the Speech
Clause protects it so robustly. Yet it does not make us all the press for
Press Clause purposes. This is why the time has come to embrace
press exceptionalism. Acknowledging that there are certain speakers
who are most effectively fulfilling valuable roles in our democracy creates an opportunity to give needed meaning to the First Amendment’s
Press Clause.
It is neither elitist nor discriminatory to separate the press from
other types of speakers. Our equality principles are satisfied as long as
we ensure that all speakers have a fair opportunity to attain this status. Technological developments are advancing, rather than inhibiting, this goal by opening up increasingly more paths for nontraditional
speakers to function as the press.
Accepting that it is a subset of speakers, and not everyone, who is
consistently and effectively playing these functional roles is the first
step. The second step is to have the confidence that we can identify
these special speakers with sufficient (albeit not perfect) specificity.
Analyzing the role of “minister” in Hosanna-Tabor, the Court showed
us how to take a holistic approach that focuses on unique functions
and relies on valuable cues provided by third parties and public institutions as proxies.
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At times it might feel as if we are all now not just speakers but also
the press. We are not, and we should embrace this distinction. Ultimately, everyone benefits by properly protecting those few who truly
are fulfilling this unique and constitutionally recognized role.

